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Abstract 
The goal of this study was to investigate the translate-ability 
of creative works into other domains. We tested whether 
people were able to recognize which works of art were 
inspired by which pieces of music. Three expert painters 
created four paintings, each of which was the artist’s 
interpretation of one of four different pieces of instrumental 
music. Participants were able to identify which paintings were 
inspired by which pieces of music at statistically significant 
above-chance levels. The findings support the hypothesis that 
creative ideas can exist in an at least somewhat domain-
independent state of potentiality and become more well-
defined as they are actualized in accordance with the 
constraints of a particular domain. 
Keywords: art; artifacts; common coding; creativity; domain 
generality; ekphrastic expression; individual differences; 
interpretation; music; self-expression; style; potentiality; 
synesthesia; translation. 
Introduction 
Although much social interaction occurs directly through 
words or actions, a great deal of what humans attempt to 
communicate, such as ideas for works of art, science, or 
technology, are not readily expressed through these 
channels. Complex ideas are therefore often communicated 
indirectly by way of artifacts. There is evidence that artists 
leave something of themselves—their own personal 
signatures or creative styles—in their artifacts, and that 
creators’ identities are recognizably present in their creative 
works. For example, creative writing students familiar with 
each other’s writing identified significantly above chance, 
not just which of their creative writing classmates had 
written each particular piece of writing but which of their 
creative writing classmates had created each artwork 
(Gabora, 2010; Gabora, O’Connor, & Ranjan, 2012). Thus, 
at least in some cases, if a viewer is familiar with the works 
of creators in a particular domain (such as creative writing), 
it is possible for the viewer to recognize which creator 
generated which work, and this is even the case if the works 
are in a different domain (such as art).  
This does not, however, imply that creative artifacts are 
just the external expression of individual style. We suggest 
that artifacts constitute a beehive of hidden social 
interaction, and that their forms reflect, in part, the attempt 
to transcend one’s individuality, i.e., to relinquish oneself to 
the essence of an idea. We suggest that when personal style 
is recognizably evident in a work, this is not necessarily due 
to an attempt to express this style, but a side effect of 
participating in the human enterprise of interactively 
evolving cultural outputs by adapting them to different 
personal styles, perspectives, and modalities. The creative 
process involves not just accessing and combining 
knowledge, experiences, and ideas, but also inspiration, 
translation, and re-interpretation (Cropley, 1999; Feldhusen, 
1995, 2002; Munford & Gustafson, 1988; Sternberg & 
Lubart, 1995). Components of a creative work may 
originate from oneself, others with whom one has 
communicated directly or indirectly by way of others, or 
even multiple individuals through the course of history who 
each put their own spin on it. Inspiration may come from a 
work in same domain as the work it inspires (as when one 
poem inspires an idea for another poem). Alternatively, an 
idea may first be expressed by one individual in one 
domain, and subsequently translated by someone else into 
another domain (as when a piece of music gets re-cast in 
another musical genre, or even inspires a poem). With the 
advent of new technologies and social media, the distinction 
between social interaction and individual creative 
expression becomes increasingly blurred. For example, as 
one moves from face-to-face communication, to avatar-
mediated communication, to music inspired by and intended 
for someone else, to background music to accompany the 
activities of a particular cartoon character, to music 
composed with no obvious inspirational source, it is 
difficult to draw the line between social interaction and 
individual self-expression, and cross-modal perception. 
The goal of this research was to test the hypothesis that it 
is possible to recognize the source of inspiration for a 
creative work when that source of inspiration comes from a 
different medium. There are several phenomena that suggest 
that a creative work need not be in the same domain as the 
inspirational source for the work. 
Related Phenomena 
We now review phenomena that point to cross-domain 
interpretation of ideas as a source of the character of 
creative works: synesthesia, ekphrastic expression, and 
cross-domain style.  
Synesthesia Individuals referred to as synesthetes 
naturally and spontaneously translate stimuli into another 
sensory domain. For example, they may see particular 
letters or numbers in particular colors. Ramachandran 
(2003) proposed that synesthesia occurs as a result of hyper-
connectivity in the brain due to partial collapse of the barrier 
between sensory domains. Artists, poets, and novelists, are 
more likely than average to be synesthetes, which suggests 
that synesthetically driven re-interpretation of inputs from 
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one modality to another can play a role in these creative 
domains (Ramachandran, 2003). 
Ekphrastic Expression There is a tradition in the arts of 
interpreting art from one medium (e.g., oil paint) into 
another (e.g., watercolor) and thereby coming to know its 
underlying essence. This practice is referred to as ekphrastic 
expression. The idea behind ekphrastic expression is that an 
artist may have a more direct impact on an audience by 
translating art from one medium into another medium 
because this involves capturing, and thereby becoming 
intimate with, its underlying form or essence. Ekphrasis 
may be related to the late nineteenth Century practice of 
associating particular kinds of music with particular colors. 
There is anecdotal evidence that music of this time 
frequently served as a direct inspiration for paintings, and 
musical terminology was used as titles for paintings. 
Ekphrastic expression is not just a phenomenon of the past. 
Modern day film composers attempt to compose music that 
conveys the emotional tone of the events portrayed in the 
film, thereby heightening the viewer’s experience of these 
events. Thus film scoring can be seen as a form of 
ekphrasis. The application of ekphrastic methods in the arts 
supports the idea that creative individuals extract patterns of 
information from the constraints of the domains in which 
they were originally expressed and transform them into 
other domains.  
Cross-Media Style Another reason to suspect that the 
character of creative works arises through cross-domain re-
interpretations of ideas is the widespread phenomenon of 
cross-media style. This refers to artistic style that is 
demonstrated by works of art in more than one medium. For 
example, the term rococo is applied to a style of painting, 
sculpture, literature, and music of the 18th Century. Works 
in a given style are thought to derive from abstract 
archetypal forms or potentialities that make the artistic mind 
want to explore different arrangements or manifestations 
(Burke, 1957).  
Cross-modal Perception The phenomenon of cross-
media style provides evidence that creative works in 
different media may be similar in terms of psychophysical, 
collative, and ecological properties (Hasenfus, 1978). 
Aesthetic perceptions stimulated by creative works may 
generate emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and/or 
physiological responses that are amenable to re-expression 
in another form. This may arise in part due to regularities 
with respect to the choice of elements (i.e., colors, shapes, 
words) and/or how they are used (e.g., in an orderly or 
chaotic manner) (Berlyne, 1971). Studies indicate that there 
are non-arbitrary mapping between properties of vision and 
sound (Griscom & Palmer, 2012; Mark 1975, Melara, 1989; 
Melara, & Marks, 1990; Melara & O’Brien, 1987; Palmer, 
Langlois, Tsang, Schloss, & Levitin, 2011; Ward et al. 
2006). For example, the processing of some visual features, 
such as spatial frequency and lightness, can be affected by 
auditory features such as pitch and timbre (Mark, 1987). 
In the study that perhaps comes closest in spirit to this 
one, composers were asked to write music inspired by four 
simple line-drawn shapes: a square, a lightning bold, a curvy 
shape, and a jagged shape (Willmann, 1944). Music inspired 
by the same shape was more similar than music inspired by 
another shape with respect to tempo, melodic pattern, mood, 
and other characteristics, and listeners could match above 
chance the music to the shape that inspired it. However, the 
music could not be said to be reinterpretations of creative 
works, for the impoverished nature of the stimuli 
undoubtedly limited the scope for creative expression. The 
study reported here is the inverse of Willmann’s; it 
investigates not music inspired by art but art inspired by 
music. Moreover, the goal was to go beyond simple cross-
modal mappings to convey in another domain the rich 
emotionality of genuinely creative works.  
Methods 
This study examined whether people were able to correctly 
recognize which works of art were inspired by which pieces 
of music. The study was divided into two phases. In the first 
phase, expert artists created four paintings, each of which 
was the artist’s interpretation of one of four different pieces 
of instrumental music. In the second phase, naïve 
participants attempted to determine which piece of music 
was used as the source of inspiration for each artwork. 
Phase One 
Participants Two local expert artists, each with 
approximately 25 years of experience in the field of 
painting, were recruited for this study. They each received 
50$ for their participation.  
Musical Stimuli Four pieces of piano music from 
commercially produced sound track CDs with no vocal tract 
and no other instrumentation were used as stimuli to inspire 
art. They were selected from a pool of 45 pieces chosen as 
exemplary of different musical styles: baroque classical, 
romantic, jazz, and contemporary. Each of these original 45 
pieces of music was cropped to three minutes duration, and 
then rated by three raters on 64 descriptive adjectives on 
five point Likert scales. The adjectives were derived from 
previous research on the collative properties of stimulus 
patterns, specifically, measures of affective reactions to 
artwork (Berlyne, 1974), and the affective circumplex 
(Russel, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). The raters had no 
previous musical training.  
Factor analysis and multidimensional scaling were used to 
compute the basic dimensions of aesthetic experience in the 
ratings, and to reveal how the 45 pieces of music were 
dispersed in the dimensional spaces. The Euclidean 
distances between the pieces of music across the spaces 
were used to select four pieces of music from different 
regions that were clearly dissimilar from each other. The 
four selected pieces of music were:  
(1) ‘Love is a Mystery’ by Ludovico Einaudi 
(2) Number 29 B Flat Major’, by Ludwig van Beethoven 
(3) ‘Circus Gallop’ by Marc-André Hamelin  
(4) ‘All of Me’ by Jon Schmidt 
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Creation of Artworks Each of the two artists created one 
painting for each of the four pieces of piano music, for a 
total of 8 paintings. On days that paintings were to be 
created, each artist was provided with a single piece of 
music and asked to reinterpret it as a painting, i.e., to paint 
what the music would look like if it were a painting. They 
were instructed to paint while listening to the music, and 
encouraged to listen to it as many times as they wished 
while they painted. They were allowed to use whatever 
painting supplies they thought could most effectively 
express the music (e.g., watercolors, oils, and acrylics were 
all acceptable). They were instructed to complete their 
paintings in one sitting without interruption. They were 
instructed to take up to a maximum of 120 minutes to listen 
to the music and complete the painting. The paintings were 
created in the artists’ personal studios. In order to limit the 
influence of the previous pieces of music on the new 
painting, the artists were instructed not to re-listen to the 
piece of music after the painting was finished, and there was 
a gap of four days between each painting session.  
 Representative examples of the music-inspired paintings 
obtained in Phase One of the study are provided in Figures 
1, 2 and 3. These paintings constituted the stimuli that were 
used in Phase Two. Figures 1 and 2, painted by the same 
artist in response to different pieces of music, provide the 
reader with a qualitative sense of the extent to which an 
artist’s personal style comes through in different paintings. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A painting generated by first of the artists as an 
interpretation of the piece Number 29 B Flat Major’, by 
Ludwig van Beethoven. 
 
 
  
Figure 2. A painting generated by first artist as an 
interpretation of the piece ‘All of Me’ by Jon Schmidt. 
 
By comparing figures 2 and 3, painted by different artists 
in response to the same piece of music, the reader can obtain 
a qualitative sense of how a common musical source of 
inspiration manifests in different paintings.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. A painting generated by the second artist as an 
interpretation of the piece ‘All of Me’ by Jon Schmidt. 
Phase Two 
In the second phase of the study we tested whether it was 
possible to recognize which pieces of music were 
interpreted as which paintings.  
 Participants The participants were two groups of 
undergraduates enrolled in psychology courses at the 
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University of British Columbia, consisting of 107 and 89 
students respectively, for a total of 196 students. They 
received partial course credit for their participation.  
Analytic Methods Two statistics, H and Hu, were 
computed to assess the accuracies of the participants’ 
paintings-to-music matches. H is the simple hit rate, or the 
proportion of correct guesses. Hu comes from signal 
detection theory (Wagner, 1993). It corrects for chance 
guessing and for response bias, such as the tendency to use 
particular response categories more or less than other 
response categories. For each set of paintings (i.e., for 
paintings by artist one and artist two), two hit rate statistics 
were computed for each participant. One-sample t-tests and 
a data randomization procedure (Manly, 2007) were then 
used to assess the statistical significance of the mean H and 
Hu values. The tests indicated whether the mean H and Hu 
values were significantly different from the H and Hu values 
that would have been obtained had participants provided 
random guesses. 
Procedure and Materials This part of the study was set 
up online. There were two sets of the study, one for each 
artist. In each set, there were the four pieces of music and 
the four paintings created in phase one by each artist. Each 
painting was displayed on a web page. Next to each painting 
were links to the four pieces of music. Two groups of 
participants consisting of 89 and 107 students were asked to 
look at the painting and to listen to the four pieces of music 
respectively. They were asked to identify which piece of 
music inspired each painting.  
Results 
The results are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Mean hit rates, t-test values, and r effect size for 
identification of paintings inspired by pieces of music. All 
hit rates and t values were statistically significant. 
 
 Mean 
Hit Rate 
Chance 
Hit Rate 
 
t(df) 
r 
Effect 
Size 
Artist One 
Hit Rate (H) 
 
.35 .24 4.0 (88) .39 
Artist One 
Unbiased 
Hit Rate 
(Hu) 
 
.36 .24 4.0 (88) .40 
Artist Two 
Hit Rate (H) 
 
.44 .25 6.3(106) .52 
Artist Two 
Unbiased 
Hit Rate 
(Hu) 
 
.46 .25 6.3(106) .52 
 
For the first artist, the mean hit rates were H = .35 and Hu = 
.36. The mean hit rates that would have been obtained on 
the basis of random guesses for these questions were .25 
and .25, respectively. Both hit rates are statistically 
significant according to both conventional and data 
randomization t-tests (t(88) = 4.0, t(88) = 4.0, p < .001), and 
the r effect sizes were large, .39 and .40. For the second 
artist, the mean hit rates were high, H = .44 and Hu = .46, 
statistically significant according to both conventional and 
data randomization t-tests (t(106) = 6.3, t(106) = 6.3, p < 
.001), and the effect sizes were large, r = .52 and r = .52. 
Thus participants identified at above-chance levels which 
paintings were inspired by which pieces of music for both 
artist one and artist two.  
Discussion 
There is a longstanding debate concerning the extent to 
which the semantic complexity of artistic works is amenable 
to scientific methods (Becker, 1982). We tested the 
hypothesis that the core idea behind a creative work is 
recognizable when it is translated from one domain to 
another. To our knowledge, the only other previous study to 
test this hypothesis (Willmann, 1944) used highly artificial 
stimuli that most would not consider creative works in and 
of themselves. The hypothesis was supported by our finding 
that when pieces of music were re-interpreted as paintings, 
naïve participants were able to guess significantly above 
chance which piece of music inspired which painting. 
Although the medium of expression is different, something 
of its essence remains sufficiently intact for an observer to 
detect a resemblance between the new work and the source 
that inspired it. The results are consistent with a number of 
phenomena familiar to artists, mentioned in the 
Introduction, namely synesthesia, ekphrastic expression, 
cross-media style, and cross-modal perception. 
The research reported on here may be a step toward 
distinguishing between domain-specific and domain-general 
aspects of creative works. We suggest that at their core, 
creative ideas may be much less domain-dependent than 
they are generally assumed to be. Our results support the 
view that the uniqueness of a creative work derives at least 
in part from, not just the personal style of the creator, but 
from encounters with works in domains that differ from the 
domain of the creative output, or even different kinds of 
experiences altogether. In other words, it is possible for the 
domain-specific aspects to be stripped away such that the 
creative work exists in an abstracted state of potentiality at 
which point they are amenable to re-expression in another 
form. A creative idea may exist in form that is freed of the 
constraints of a particular domain, and that the creator’s job 
may be in part to, to simply allow that domain-independent 
entity to take a particular form, using domain-specific 
expertise and the tools of his or her trade. Over time they 
may become more fully actualized, and well-defined, as 
they are considered from different perspectives in 
accordance with the constraints of the domain in which they 
are expressed.  
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The capacity for cross-domain translation of creative 
ideas supports the hypothesis that an individual’s creative 
outputs are expressions of a particular underlying uniquely 
structured self-organizing internal model of the world, or 
worldview. Our creative abilities may be a reflection of the 
tendency of a worldview to transform in such a way as to 
find connections, reduce dissonance, and achieve a more 
stable structure (Gabora & Merrifield, 2012). This view of 
creativity is consistent with previous research showing that 
midway through a creative process, an idea may exist in a 
‘half-baked’ state of potentiality, in which one or more 
elements are ill-defined (Gabora, 2005, Gabora & Saab, 
2011). When a work is translated from one domain (e.g., 
music) into another (e.g., painting), the two works may be 
recognizably related because the process by which the 
worldview assimilates or comes to terms with the works is 
at a structural level deeply analogous.  
Although that idea that at least some creative tasks 
involve the abstraction and re-expression of ‘raw’ 
potentialities or forms seems obvious to many artists we 
have spoken with, it stands in contrast with most academic 
theories of creativity. Creativity is typically portrayed as a 
process of searching and selecting amongst candidate ideas 
that exist in discrete, well-defined states. This can be traced 
back to early views arising in the artificial intelligence 
community, wherein creativity was thought to proceed by 
heuristically guided search through a space of possible 
solutions (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1957; Newell & Simon, 
1972; Simon, 1973, 1986) or possible problem 
representations (e.g., Kaplan & Simon, 1990, Ohlsson, 
1992). The view that creativity proceeds through a process 
of search and selection is also assumed in more 
contemporary theories, such as the theory that creativity is a 
Darwinian process; i.e., new ideas are obtained by 
generating variations more or less at random and selecting 
the best (e.g., Campbell, 1965; Simonton 1999a,b, 2005). 
Our results bring up the question of what it was about the 
paintings that made it possible to trace them to the artworks 
that had inspired them. We are currently investigating to 
what extent people assign similar experience variable 
ratings and similarity ratings to paintings and the music that 
inspired them and whether these ratings correspond even 
when participants cannot identify which piece of music 
inspired the painting. A possible clue to the mechanisms 
underlying cross-domain interpretation of creative ideas 
comes from research by Feedberg and Gallese (2007) on 
perceiving action in artwork. They propose that art 
observers implicitly imitate the creative actions undertaken 
by the artist in the making of the work. In our study it is 
possible that observers were not just perceiving action in art 
but were also able to match qualities of the art with qualities 
such as the rhythm and tempo of the music that inspired it. 
The phenomenon of action perception in paintings could 
also at least partially account for the ability to recognize the 
essence of ideas interpreted across domains. In order to 
recognize the inspiration of an artwork or a cross-media 
style, expertise in a domain might stimulate the action 
system while the observer imagines how the artwork was 
created. Thus, future research will also investigate the role 
of expertise in the recognition of a connection between 
works in different domains. We hypothesis that expertise in 
a domain might increase the activation of the action system 
while the observer imagines how the artwork got created, 
thereby enhancing the capacity for recognition of cross-
domain re-interpretation in a task such as this. 
The effect of inspirational source on creative output may 
be weaker than the effect of personal style reported earlier 
(Gabora, 2010; Gabora, O’Connor & Ranjan, 2012), given 
that paintings by different artists inspired by the same piece 
of music could be quite different, as seen by comparing 
Figures 2 and 3. This could however reflect individual 
differences with respect to which elements of the source had 
sufficient personal relevance to serve as departure points for 
the artists’ own creative works. This interpretation is 
consistent with the finding that when pictures were used as 
stimuli for poetry, poets focused on particular portions of 
the pictures to serve as the basis for their poems, and 
different poets focused on different portions (Patrick, 1935). 
We are currently investigating how these two factors 
interact, i.e., whether artists’ individual styles influence the 
ease of identifying which music inspired their paintings. 
Our aim is not to partition out how much creative works 
owe their distinctive character to their creators and how 
much they owe to other sources. We suspect that such a 
partitioning is not possible, that in the most successful 
creative works there is a fusion of the two, and that the 
ability to fuse ones’ personal style with the inspirational 
source for a work plays a role in artistic genius. Though 
commonly portrayed as introverted and withdrawn, the 
creative genius may, through the assimilation and 
generation of creative artifacts, be deeply immersed in a 
form of social interaction that connects all of humanity to 
the deepest and most influential thinkers our world has 
known. We suggest that the extent to which the arts feed on 
the cross-domain adaptation and reinterpretation of ideas 
has been underappreciated, and that it may in fact play a 
pivotal role in the evolution of human culture. 
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